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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
VERN B. MILLARD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
JESSE H. PARRY and ELSIE H. PARRY, his wife,

No. 8026

Defendants and Respondents.
STRAND ELECTRIC SERVICE COMpANY, A Corporation, a n d OTTO
DREWS,

Defendants.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF
IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION. FOR REHEARING
The appellant Vern B. Millard respectfully moves this
Honorable Court to vacate its decision heretofore entered in
this case, and appellant petitions this Court to grant him a rehearing upon the following grounds and for reasons set forth
hereinafter:
3
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1. The opinion of the Court and the affirmance of the
judgment, are predicated on substantial misstatements and omissions of material undisputed evidence.

2. The Court has in effect denied the plaintiff his constitutional right of appeal by predicating its decision on a state
of facts materially at variance with the record made in the district court.

3. The opinion disregards one of the flagrant errors of
the trial court by ignoring the distinction between recovery for
changes on the basis of cost plus 10% as agreed upon, and the
much lower basis of "reasonable value" adopted by the lower
court.
4.

The decision is contrary to law.

5. The decision misconstrues the stipulation of the parties, and exceeds the jurisdiction of this Court by reaching out
to cover a portion of the judgment from which no appeal was
taken.
6. The denial of interest on sums due and owing to
plaintiff is contrary to law, and amounts to making a contract
for the parties without any meeting of minds.
WHEREOF, appellant respectfully requests that the decision be vacated and that the Court grant a rehearing both as
to the facts and the law, for the reason that there is a serious
miscarriage of justice by the decision.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL E. REIMANN,
Attorney for the Appellant.
4
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT
Point 1:
The opinion of the Court and the affirmance of
the judgment, are predicated on substantial misstatements and omissions of material undisputed evidence.

Notwithstanding the high esteem in which counsel for
appellant holds the writer of the decision, the opinion is erroneous both as to the facts and the law. Counsel for appellant
respectfully requests this Honorable Court to re-read the Brief
of Appellant, and also the Reply Brief of Appellant wherein
appellant points out various assertions which respondents make
in their brief whch contradict the record. Counsel for appellant
painstakingly pointed out by specific reference to the record on
appeal wherein respondents misquote or otherwise misstate the
facts. Nevertheless the opinion contradicts the record, and
thereby creates disputed ''issues of fact'' in instances where there
were no disputes. The injury to plaintiff amounts to more than
$18,000.00, which is sufficient to wipe out the appellant's working capital, when he was the innocent victim of the mistakes of
the owner and his architect.
In this case the appellant started with a construction project which was to cost $82,000.00, which ultimately cost appellant as contractor more than $111,000.00, by reason of mistakes
of respondent's architect and in consequence of numerous
changes demanded by the owners. There was no dispute as to
the fact that the building as actually built, was reasonably worth
$116,000.00. The opinion of the Court makes the contractor
the victim, although he was the innocent party.
On page 2, last paragraph, it is stated contrary to the
record:
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" ... It must also noted that in the matters referred
to, plaintiff rlies chiefly upon alleged promises and
representations of the architect, and upon the contention
that the architect was the agent for the defendants. An
architect is not ordinarily a g~neral agent of his employer (3 Am. Jur. 1000) and in this instance it was
expressly so provided in the contract documents. Clearly he did not have authority to bind Parry on a promise
of construction of another structure."

The statement is not only an unfair statement of the contention of appellant, but it contradicts the findings submitted
by respondents and adopted by the trial court to the effect tha
the architect was the agent of defendants Parry when he asked
the plaintiff to submit a bid. Finding of Fact No. 5 so recites:
"That the plaintiff on or about the lOth day of January 1951, was requested by the defendants Parry agent
and architect, Leroy W. Johnson to enter into a written contract with the said defendant Jesse H. Parry ... "
The writer of the poinion says that the architect was not
the agent of the owners under the terms of the contract documents. That is not the contention of appellant. Even if the architect was a supervisor under the contract documents, that fact
does not alter the admitted and undisputed fact that prior to
the signing of the contract documents the architect was the
agent of the owners, and Jesse H. Parry so admitted and the
court found that to be the fact. The opinion contra_dicts paragraph 5 of the findings which clearly recite that prior to the
signing of the contract documents, the architect was the agent
of the owners. That particular portion of the finding w,as not
before this Court for review.
While the architect was the agent of the owners, his representations and instructions to Mr. Millard as to what should be
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included in the bid and what was to be excluded, were the
representations and instructions of the owners.
Defendant Parry testified that he hired the architect about
December 1st. He admitted that he left various matters to the
architect, as that is "what I hired him for." Even the architect
called as a witness for defendants testified that the architect
controls the bidding and the contractor is supposed to follow
the directions of the architect. (R. 85 3-85 5). The architect procured a bid on plumbing and told Mr. Millard to base his bid
on that figure. He also told Mr. Millard to exclude sewer as
that was to be covered by another construction project. It is undisputed that the contract documents reserve to the owner the
right to let other contracts, (Exhibit P-3).
The opinion on page 3 further misstates the record:
"Plaintiff's sixth point is that even if the contract
were not voidable it could not be construed to require
plaintiff to furnish items in excess of those on which
the architect, as agent of the owners, instructed plaintiff to base his bid. We find no merit to this point. The
items complained of were described and included within the written specifications and we find no reason to
reject the trial court's finding that they were not intended to be eliminated. It would constitute a strange
departure from the rule relating to the effect of a written contract to sustain the contention of plaintiff on this
point. Also, the architect, testifying as plaintiff's witness, stated that the estimates on plumbing furnished by
him to plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's bid included
cost of water and sewer connections which is one of
the chief items objected to by plaintiff under this head."
Appellant respectfully submit that the Court has misstated
the record to the prejudice of the rights of plaintiff. The Court
has adopted a misstatement of the respondents and has disre7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

garded the plain facts of the record. The exhibit in question
which was submitted bf the architect to plaintiff (Exhibit P-4)
expressly states: "This does not include sewer or water meter
service." The Court must have overlooked said instrument. Contrary to the statement in the opinion, the architect did not state
that the bid included water and sewer connections. The opinion
likewise does not mention the fact that defendant Parry had in
his possession Exhibit D-27 dated December 14, 1950, which
stated as the cost of the plumbing the eract amount of Erhibit
P-4 which specifically declared that sewer and water were not·
included. Said Exhibit also stated the heating allowance. When
the heating was decided upon after the contract documents were
signed, the heating costs were in excess of the allowance which
the architect instructed Mr. Millard to provide in his bid.
The Court in the opinion has overlooked the facts which
show that the contractor was the victim of the instructions given
by the owners' agent in the submission of his bid, and the further
fact that the contractor's bid was originally $90,000.00, then
reduced to $85,212 on the direction to exclude sewer and water
lines and rely on the Barnes bid, and to limit the heating allowance. Finally the architect induced the contractor to reduce his
bid still more by $3,212 by the assurance that he would be
awarded construction of the second project.
The point which the writer of the opinion has inadvertently
overlooked is that a party who requests another person to omit ·
items from his bid (whether he does so by agent or personally)
cannot later be heard to say that those items were contracted for,
since there· has been no meeting of the minds for their inclusion. Furthermore,· contrary to the statement in the opinion, the
contract documents did not require inclusion of those items in
the performance by the general contractor. Exhibit P-3, page 34
actually provides:
8
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"Provide all necessary materials and labor for the
installation of 4" diameter soil pipe sewer from the
building and connecting to the city sewer as shown on
the plot plan.''
It is undisputed that there was no plot plan in existence
when the contract document was signed. Exhibit 16, a plot plan
which shows sewer, clearly shows that the sewer was intended
to be part of another construction project. The defendant Parry
identified a letter dated July 1951 from the architect which
states that the sewer was not included in the original construction project.
No plot plan of a sewer ever came into existence as a part
of construction project No. 1. When defendant Parry constructed the sewer, he did not use soil pipe, which is the least
expensive type of construction, but he used cast iron which cost
several times more, and instead of laying the line directly to
the street as shown on the master plan, he ran it diagonally and
much deeper which made the line considerably longer and more
costly. (R. 762-763). Yet, the trial court gave credit for the
entire cost of the sewer with expensive cast iron pipe, which
amounted to "adding insult to injury."
"Plaintiffs final point is that the court erred in
failing to allow, even as extras, costs incurred by plaintiff through the conduct of defendants an dtheir architect and also in its findings as to costs of extras which
were to be paid for on a cost-plus basis. It appears from
the detailed findings that the trial court went into the
matter of extras very meticulously and we have not
found anything to justify us in disturbing such find-

ings ... ''
The reason the Court did not find anything to disturb the
findings is poi!sibly because the Court overlooked the fact that
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the trial court based its allowance not on cost-plus 10% but on
a theory of "reasonable value," which amounted to only a small
fraction of actual costs incurred by plaintiff. The real issue is
not even discussed in the opinion. The trial court did not allow
plaintiff recovery on the basis of actual costs plus 10% for the
changes.
There are other matters in the opinion which are not accurately stated, but the facts misstated or omitted as hereinabove
referred to affect the plaintiff to the extent of more than
$18,000.00.

Point 2:
The Court has in effect denied the plaintiff his constitutional right of appeal by predicating its decision
on a state of facts materially at variance with the record
made in the district court.

Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution of Utah not
only provides for a right of appeal, but specifies: "The appeal
shall be upon the record made in the court below." It seems to
counsel for appellant that where the Court on appeal is in substantial error in its statement of the facts by material variance
from the facts established in the district court, there ought to be
a rehearing, for an opinion of the Court predicated upon alleged facts which are not the actual facts of the case, for all
practical purposes is a denial of the right of appeal since it is
not a review of the record made in the district court.

Point 3·:
The opinion disregards one of the flagrant errors
of the trial court by ignoring the distinction between
10
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recovery for changes on the basis of cost plus 10%
as agreed upon, and the much lower basis of rrreasonable value" adopted by the lower court.

The opinion side-steps Point 8 in the Brief of Appellant by
the highly inaccurate comment that "the trial court went into
the matter of extras very meticulously and we have not found
anything to justify us in disturbing such findings." The Court
should have observed the error, for the simple reason that notwithstanding the defendants testified that for extras and changes
the contractor was to be paid "cost plus 10%," and notwithstanding the trial court found numerous items were changes and
extras, the trial court scaled down recovery therefor to a small
fraction of the actual cost in most instances on the theory that
plaintiff was only entitled to "reasonable allowance." As
pointed out in the Brief of Appellant that scaling down process
by trial court injured plaintiff to the extent of thousands of
dallars.
The Brief of Appellant cites the cases which clearly point
out the distinction between agreements to recover on a costplus basis and those which merely allow "reasonable value.''
Those citations merit re-examination.

'ljl

In effect, the trial court said Mr. Millard was entitled to
his actual costs plus 10% as even the defendants testified that
such was the agreement, but in contradiction of such decision,
the court deprived Mr. Millard of thousands of dollars of his
actual costs by allowing him only a small fraction thereof. The
opinion of this Honorable Court seems to miss that point altogether, and it is respec~fully requested that the Court re-read
the Brief of Appellant and the Reply Brief, as counsel for ap·
pellant meticulously presented both the facts and the law whic~
have been overlooked in the decision.
~

I
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Point 4:
The decision is contrary to law.

First, the decision is wrong and grievously unjust because
it is predicated upon false premises. Secondly, the decision applies the wrong rules because it has the wrong facts.
At the time the architect requested appellant to bid on
construction and when he gave the specific instructions as to
what items were to be excluded from the bid and what allowances to make for specific items, the architect was the agent for
the owners. He was hired for doing that type of work as well
as to draw plans and to prepare specifications. The appellant
had a duty to follow those directions. It cannot be said with any
semblance of candor that he did not rely on what the architect
told him. The contractor was not injured by miscalculations of
his own employees. The contractor was injured to the extent
of more than $20,000.00 by reason of the instructions and representations of the agent of the owners.
It makes no difference whether the agent was specifically
directed by the owners to make the particular statements he
made. The fact is that he was engaged to line up materials
(which is one of the functions of the general contractor) . He
got a plumbing bid for the owners, which specifically excluded
water and sewer connections. Said agent got the original bid of
plaintiff reduced from $90,000.00 to $82,000.00 upon his instructions to limit allowances for specific items and to exclude
other items. As agent for the owners, in the pressure to meet
deadlines he made numerous mistakes and contradictions. The
owners bargained for construction worth $82,000.00 and they
wound up with construction worth $116,000.00 which cost the
contractor more than $111,000.00 without even any allowance
for his services.
12
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Under elementary rules of agency, the owners were responsible for all of the representations and statements of the archi. teet. They obtained the benefits. The contractor was the innocent party, and he is entitled as a matter of equity to rescission,
and to idemnification.
· Equity even relieves a contractor of a mistake in a bid.
(9 Am. Jur. p. 7). However, in this case the contractor made
the type of bid he was instructed to make, and he reduced his
bid on the representations of the agent of owner. To permit the
innocent contractor to get rrstuck" is shocking and unconscionable, as it amounts to a device whereby an owner gets rrsomething for nothing."
Even if there were any substance to the contention that the
owners did not authorize their agent to give the instructions to
Mr. Millard which induced him to scale his bid down successively by a total of $8,000.00, since the architect admittedly
performs the function of giving directions on how to bid, all
such an argument could establish is that there was no meeting
of the minds and hence no valid contract.
There has been a serious miscarriage of justice in this
case: (a) The owners obtained a lower bid by reason of instructions and representations of their agent. (b) The mistakes
and incompleteness in the plans prepared by the owners' agent
necessitated numerous changes, and the trial court allowed only
a fraction of the costs. (c) The owners themselves demanded
numerous changes and additions which greatly increased the
cost, and the trial court disregarded the owners' admission that
they were to pay cost plus 10%, and allowed only a fraction of
the actual costs on a theory of "reasonable allowance," contrary to the adjudicated cases.
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The plaintiff is injured to the extent of approximately
$20,000.00 by making him the victim of the owners' agent's instructions, and by denying him full recovery on the basis of
actual cost plus 10% and by substitution of the "reasonable
allowance" theory which gives the owners a free ride to the
extent of thousands of dollars. Equity does not countenance
unjust enrichment. Even if the owners had been entitled to
complain about their own agent's act, as between innocent
parties, the plaintiff as the victim was entitled to be made
whole, particularly when those acts and instructions and representations of the agent enured to the benefit of owners by
thousands of dollars.
This is not a case where the contractor bungled. He did
a good job. It cost a lot of money to correct the mistakes in
the architect's plans. He did not engage in any controversy with
the owners. This Court leaves the contractor holding the bag
by simply contradicting the finding of the court that the architect was the agent of the owners. Certainly, the briefs submitted
by appellant deserve re-reading, as they were prepared painstakingly.
There is no justice in referring to an uncontradicted situation as a disputed question of fact. Regardless of what a witness may say on direct examination, when on cross-examination
he admits that a party was his agent and that he was hired for
that purpose any possible conflict is resolved, for the rr testimony of a witness is no stronger than where it is left on
cross-examination." But when the court finds that the architeCt was the agent of the owner, and neither party has made
an isue of it and the owners have submitted such a finding,
why should this Court contradict it when it cannot possibly
be an issue on any phase of the appeal taken from only a portion of the judgment?
14
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The opinion contradicts the express terms of written instruments, as illustrated by the comment on Exhibit P-3, and
Exhibit P-4. One exhibit consisted of the court file, LeRoy W.
Johnson v. J. H. Parry, Case No. 94041, shows a counterclaim
filed February 13, 1952, which recites (and which was admitted by reply) :
"That on or about December 14, 1950, plaintiff
and defendant entered into an oral contract for architectural and supervisory service covering the erection
of an 11 unit apartment at the rear of 160 South 13th
East Street, Salt Lake City, Utah."
The trial court erroneously excluded said exhibit as being
"immaterial" although it should that the agency of the architect for owners arose December 14, 1950, or a date prior to the
date when he gave the instructions to Mr. Millard as to how to
prepare his bids. Notwithstanding the trial judge excluded
said exhibit, he was forced to the conclusion that the architect
was the agent of the Parrys, during a period of a month or more
prior to the execution of the so-called montract documents.
After reaching that conclusion, however, he made the victim
responsible for his loss by saying in substance that he should
not have paid any attention to those directions although the
owners testified that the contractor was supposed to follow
directions and instructions of the architect and their own architect hired as an expert witness admitted that the architect
controls the bidding and that the contractor is supposed to
follow the directions of the architect on how to bid. By disregarding those irrefutable facts, this Court in its opiniqn has
overlooked entirely the law applicable thereto, and it has condoned the injustice to the contractor as the innocent victim.
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Point 5:
The decision misconstrues the stipulation of the
parties, and exceeds the jurisdiction of this Court by
reaching out to cover a portion of the judgment from
which no appeal was taken.

The second paragraph of the op1n10n is an incorrect
statement of the stipulation which was entered into after trial
to enable the owners to stop the running of interest. There
was no appeal from the judgment dismissing the counterclaim
of defendants. The opinion infers that the appellant stipulated
to entry of judgment against plaintiff for $435.30, as the
amount paid, when such was not the case. The stipulation has
been misconstrued. The Parrys willfully delayed payment for
two years an d caused the running up of interest and costs, and
the Court unjustly makes the plaintiff liable for the defaults
of the Parrys.

)

1

'
I
.1'

Point 6:
The denial of interest on sums due and owing to
plaintiff is contrary to law, and amounts to making
a contract for the parties without any meeting of
minds.

The fourth paragraph of the opinion denies plaintiff recovery of interest, b u t such denial is predicated u p o n an
incorrect statement of the record. The opinion states that the
plaintiff billed defendants on the wrong basis, and that therefore interest did not accrue. It was admitted by the parties that
plaintiff was entitled to recover for changes and extras on a
basis of cost plus 10%. The worst objection which could be
made to the billing, is that it was excessive since it covered
total costs. Billing for an excessive amount does not stop the
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running of interest. No case can be found to that effect. The
contract document required payment in full within 30 days
after completion of construction. Completion was bound to
cover extras and changes. Defendants ordered most of the
changes and knew about them. The billing rendered was accompanied by a letter inviting the defendants to confer on the
matter with counsel for plaintiff. They voiced no objection.
They made no contention until the time of trial that the billing
was incorrect. On the contrary, they made specific payments in
accordance with the privisions of the letter which accompanied
that bill. The statement which the Court quotes for "removal of
liens" is not in point at all, for the liens which were filed were
due to the willful failure of the defendants to pay promptly
or at all. Said quoted provision, although not applicable does
not provide that interest shall be suspended.
There is nothing in the contract document which states
that if the billing is incorrect or excessive, that the obligors
shall be exempted from payment of interest. In several days
of research, counsel has been unable to find a case to support
the novel theory in the opinion.
Counsel for appellant has cited the applicable interest
statutes. The Court by implication amends those statutes, which
is not the function of this Court but within the sole province
of the legislature. Under the statute the plaintiff was entitled
to interest.
The effect of the opinion is to make a contract between
the parties to which plaintiff never assented.
The balance of the decision is just as bad, but the amounts
involved are relative minor, neverthel~s a careful re-reading
of the briefs is requested.
17
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CONCLUSION
The facts are incorrectly stated in the opinion, which indicates that the Court has a misapprehension of the record on
appeal. The recitals in the opinion contradicts the undisputed
facts in the record. The results of such substantial departures
from the record, is the application of incorrect rules of law,
and the denial of plaintiff of the judicial relief to which he
is justly entitled.
Counsel for appellant realizes that under the pressure of
a large volume of work the Court can and does make mistakes, and counsel has the duty to apprise the Court of such
errors which result in a miscarriage of justice. The loss of
$18,000.00 might be insignificant in some quarters, but to a
contractor who has that much tied up in a job as part of the
costs of construction, is a serious matter. He has not asked for
relief from blunders made by his employees. He has asked for
relief from the circumstances in which he has been placed in
good faith on his part by following the instructions and adhering to the representations of the agent of the owners and by
making numerous costly changes requested by the owners
themselves. He is the victim of application of the wrong measure of indemnification. T h e owners obtained a completed
construction worth $34,000.00 more than they originally bargained. There is no equitable basis for making the contractor
responsibile financially for the instructions given by the agent
18
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of the owner which lopped $8,000.00 off his bid nor to make
him bear the major cost of changes ordered by the owners.
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully prays that the decision heretofore entered be vacated, and that a rehearing be
granted in this cause, and that this Honorable Court re-examine
the record on appeal and the briefs of appellant upon rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL E. REIMANN,
Attorney for Appellant.
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